This'll End A Career Or Two

[Scratch33]

B-52 mistakenly flies with nukes aboard

By Michael Hoffman - Staff writer
Posted : Wednesday Sep 5, 2007 14:39:12 EDT
   
A B-52 bomber mistakenly loaded with five nuclear warheads flew from Minot Air Force Base, N.D., to Barksdale Air Force Base, La., on Aug. 30, resulting in an Air Force-wide investigation, according to three officers who asked not to be identified because they were not authorized to discuss the incident.

The B-52 was loaded with Advanced Cruise Missiles, part of a Defense Department effort to decommission 400 of the ACMs. But the nuclear warheads should have been removed at Minot before being transported to Barksdale, the officers said. The missiles were mounted onto the pylons of the bomber’s wings.

Advanced Cruise Missiles carry a W80-1 warhead with a yield of 5 to 150 kilotons and are specifically designed for delivery by B-52 strategic bombers.

Air Force spokesman Lt. Col. Ed Thomas said the transfer was safely conducted and the weapons were in Air Force custody and control at all times.

However, the mistake was not discovered until the B-52 landed at Barskdale, which left the warheads unaccounted for during the approximately 3 1/2 hour flight between the two bases, the officers said.

http://www.armytimes.com/news/2007/09/marine_nuclear_B52_070904w/

[RedSaki]

Yikes!!!  

[jude]

Whoopsie!  

[Req]

Could be worse.

"A B-52 took off from Minot Air Force Base, ND, mistakenly loaded with five nuclear warheads, and landed at Barksdale Air Force Base, LA, loaded with four nuclear warheads."

[bizarro]

Wasn't someone around here boasting about how secure our nukes are?  

[UFO]

I think you meant to say "This'll get a person or two promoted"

Hasn't anyone noticed that there's almost zero accountability for incompetence in America anymore?  Donald Trump popularized the term "You're Fired!" but I don't think it's actually practiced in this country anymore...in the private or public sector.  These days incompetence usually leads to:  payed leave, administrative leave, corrective action (which amounts to nothing), or even promotion.

[jerome_oneil]

Wasn't someone around here boasting about how secure our nukes are?  

Did any of those nukes ever leave Air Force control?

[olderigetfasteriam]

General: Well, if you could um yeah just um go ahead and send those babies back on up here we would be much obliged. Yes, today would be great. Ok then. Bye now.

[jerome_oneil]

General: Well, if you could um yeah just um go ahead and send those babies back on up here we would be much obliged. Yes, today would be great. Ok then. Bye now.

They'll probably send 'em UPS Ground.

[Req]

Sales Order Number: 75582486
Customer Number: 99673346

1 PACKAGE(S) SHIPPED THUS FAR.

UPS Tracking Number:
18362988346209961642 (Shipped from La Puente, CA)
Tracking Number Issued: 8/29/2007 7:35:21 PM
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Item   Description   Quantity
27-151-153   10 MTON STRATEGIC WHD   1
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Please visit www.ups.com to track your package. If you have any questions or concerns while your order is in transit, please contact UPS directly for inquiries.

[desert_rider]

Wanted for questioning:

[Req]

Shitty movie, taht, but an amazing soundtrack.  Hans Zimmer ftw.

by the way, Hans Zimmer got his first taste of fame as the keyboardist for The Buggles ("Video Killed The Radio Star").  

[desert_rider]

Shitty movie, taht, but an amazing soundtrack.  Hans Zimmer ftw.

by the way, Hans Zimmer got his first taste of fame as the keyboardist for The Buggles ("Video Killed The Radio Star").  

Shitty movie?!?!  How can any movie be shitty with Howie Long in it?  He makes it an instant classic!  

BTW - here's Howie with his bust!

[Mike-H]

Shitty movie?!?!  How can any movie be shitty with Howie Long in it?  He makes it an instant classic!  

BTW - here's Howie with his bust!

Looks like "someone" played football without a helmet when they were younger .......

[ksann]

I think you meant to say "This'll get a person or two promoted"

Hasn't anyone noticed that there's almost zero accountability for incompetence in America anymore?  Donald Trump popularized the term "You're Fired!" but I don't think it's actually practiced in this country anymore...in the private or public sector.  

I did yesterday. Toughest termination decision that I have ever hadto make too.


Yes, some people still say that.



ken

[Orson]

Sales Order Number: 75582486
Customer Number: 99673346

1 PACKAGE(S) SHIPPED THUS FAR.

UPS Tracking Number:
18362988346209961642 (Shipped from La Puente, CA)
Tracking Number Issued: 8/29/2007 7:35:21 PM
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Item   Description   Quantity
27-151-153   10 MTON STRATEGIC WHD   1
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Please visit www.ups.com to track your package. If you have any questions or concerns while your order is in transit, please contact UPS directly for inquiries.

 

[Jeff N]

I think you meant to say "This'll get a person or two promoted"

Hasn't anyone noticed that there's almost zero accountability for incompetence in America anymore?  Donald Trump popularized the term "You're Fired!" but I don't think it's actually practiced in this country anymore...in the private or public sector.  These days incompetence usually leads to:  payed leave, administrative leave, corrective action (which amounts to nothing), or even promotion.

I dunno 'bout that. People are being let go left and right around here. Ya sure, some of the upper management types get a version of the golden parachute, but it's up and down the line here; if you can't or won't climb on board, seek employment elsewhere.

[Bunbun]

Nice!    Wonder how much it's insured for....?

Bun

[Req]

On the off-chance that anyone's unclear, this is a huge, huge deal.  Bold is mine.  Here's some more detailed info on this, from Military Times:

Commander disciplined for nuclear mistake

By Michael Hoffman - Staff writer
Posted : Wednesday Sep 5, 2007 19:26:41 EDT

The Air Force continued handing out disciplinary actions in response to the six nuclear warheads mistakenly flown on a B-52 Stratofortress bomber from Minot Air Force Base, N.D., to Barksdale Air Force Base, La., on Aug. 30. The squadron commander in charge of Minot’s munitions crews was relieved of all duties pending the investigation.

It was originally reported that five nuclear warheads were transported, but officers who tipped Military Times to the incident who have asked to remain anonymous since they are not authorized to discuss the incident, have since updated that number to six.

Air Force and defense officials would not confirm the missiles were armed with nuclear warheads Wednesday, citing longstanding policy, but they did confirm the Air Force was “investigating an error made last Thursday during the transfer of munitions” from Minot to Barksdale.

The original plan was to transport non-nuclear Advanced Cruise Missiles, mounted on the wings of a B-52, to Barksdale as part of a Defense Department effort to decommission 400 of the ACMs. It was not discovered that the six missiles had nuclear warheads until the plane landed at Barksdale, leaving the warheads unaccounted for during the approximately 3 1/2 hour flight between the two bases, the officers said.

President Bush was immediately alerted to the mistake and the Air Force launched a service-wide investigation headed by Maj. Gen. Douglas Raaberg, director of Air and Space Operations at Air Combat Command Headquarters, said Air Force spokesman Lt. Col. Ed Thomas.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has requested daily briefings from Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Michael Moseley on the progress of the probe. Sen. Byron Dorgan, D-N.D., a member of the Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee, requested a full classified briefing, not just the preliminary information being provided to lawmakers, to explain how a mistake of this magnitude could have happened.

Thomas said the transfer was conducted safely and the American public was never in any danger since the weapons were in Air Force custody and control at all times.

But few critics were placated Wednesday by the Air Force’s reassurances.

“Nothing like this has ever been reported before and we have been assured for decades that it was impossible,” said Rep. Edward Markey, D-Mass, co-chair of the House Bi-partisan Task Force.

Non-proliferation treaty experts said the Air Force didn’t violate any international nuclear treaties by transporting the nuclear warheads on the B-52, but it was the first time since 1968 that it’s been known publicly that nuclear warheads were transported on a U.S. bomber.

After six nuclear-armed B-52s crashed from 1959-1968, the Defense Department ordered all bombers off nuclear airborne alert. The policy change occurred after a B-52 crashed in Greenland in January 1968, dropping three nuclear warheads on the island and one into the ocean.

As a gesture to Russia and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, the first Bush administration took it one step farther in 1991 by ordering all bombers to halt nuclear ground alerts, which allowed bomber crews to practice loading a nuclear warhead, but never taking off with one.

The Defense Department does transport nuclear warheads by air, but instead of bombers it uses C-17 or C-130 cargo aircraft.

“These reports are deeply disturbing,” said Rep. Ike Skelton, D-Mo., chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. “The American people, our friends, and our potential adversaries must be confident that the highest standards are in place when it comes to our nuclear arsenal.”

Nuclear weapon experts said they were shocked to find out how completely command and control over the six nuclear warheads failed to allow such a mistake to occur.

Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, said a host of security checks and warning signs must have been passed over, or completely ignored, for the warheads to have been unknowingly loaded onto the B-52.

ACMs are specifically designed to carry a W80-1 nuclear warhead with a yield of 5 to 150 kilotons and delivered by B-52 strategic bombers.

“It’s not like they had nuclear ACMs and conventional ACMs right next to each other and they just happened to load one with a nuclear warhead,” Kristensen said.

The Defense Department uses a computerized tracking program to keep tabs on each one of its nuclear warheads, he said. For the six warheads to make it onto the B-52, each one would have had to be signed out of its storage bunker and transported to the bomber. Diligent safety protocols would then have had to been ignored to load the warheads onto the plane, Kristensen said.

All ACMs loaded with a nuclear warhead have distinct red signs distinguishing them from ACMs without a nuclear yield, he said. ACMs with nuclear warheads also weigh significantly more than missiles without them.

“I just can’t imagine how all of this happened,” said Philip Coyle, a senior adviser on nuclear weapons at the Center for Defense Information. “The procedures are so rigid; this is the last thing that’s supposed to happen.”

The risk of the warheads falling into the hands of rogue nations or terrorists was minimal since the weapons never left the United States, said Michael O’Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, an independent research and policy think tank in Washington D.C.

At no time was there a risk for a nuclear detonation, even if the B-52 crashed on its way to Barksdale, said Steve Fetter, a former Defense Department official who worked on nuclear weapons policy in 1993-94. A crash would ignite the high explosives associated with the warhead, and possibly cause a leak of plutonium, but the warhead’s elaborate safeguards would prevent a nuclear detonation from occurring, he said.

“The main risk would have been the way the Air Force responded to any problems with the flight because they would have handled it much differently if they would have known nuclear warheads were onboard,” Fetter said.

It’s still unclear specifically how the B-52’s flight from Minot to Barksdale would have been different since most nuclear security protocols are classified. But, Kristensen said the flight pattern might have been different since there would have been airspace restrictions. Also, security at both airports would have heightened considerably and the communications between the pilot and the control towers would have been altered, he said.

Air Combat Command will have a command-wide mission stand-down Sept. 14 to review its procedures in response to the mistake. Even units without oversight of nuclear weapons will take part in the stand-down, Thomas said.

“The Air Force takes its mission to safeguard weapons seriously,” he said. “No effort will be spared to ensure that the matter is thoroughly and completely investigated.”

Along with the 5th Munitions Squadron commander, the munitions crews involved in mistakenly loading the nuclear warheads at Minot have been temporarily decertified from performing their duties involving munitions, pending corrective actions or additional training, Thomas said.

The error comes after the Air Force announced last March the 5th Bomb Wing won two servicewide safety awards during fiscal year 2006.

“This is really shocking,” Coyle said. “The Air Force can’t tolerate it, and the Pentagon can’t tolerate it, either.”

[bizarro]

Again, wasn't someone boasting about how tight our nuke security is?

[jerome_oneil]

Again, wasn't someone boasting about how tight our nuke security is?

You still haven't told us if any of those weapons ever left Air Force control.

* hint.  It's an answer with only two letters.  Starts with 'N.'

[bizarro]

  No shit sherlock, the fact that they went anywhere they weren't supposed to at all is a big enough problem.


Nuclear warheads taking a joy ride is not a small matter.

[UFO]

I dunno 'bout that. People are being let go left and right around here. Ya sure, some of the upper management types get a version of the golden parachute, but it's up and down the line here; if you can't or won't climb on board, seek employment elsewhere.

Define being "let go."  We've also had people "let go" for efficiency or spending reduction or their position becomes obsolete or their given a choice like "leave with this package or go on probation for 3 months at which time we will re-visit your performance" type crap.

In 10 years at this company I've never seen a person fired for incompetence or for screwing up.  And I'm talking about "You're fired.  Clear out your desk and turn in your badge to HR by noon." type scenario.  It seem very difficult to get your ass canned in this day and age of litigation.

We'll see what happens with the people involved with flying nukes around the country and not even knowing it.

[Req]

You still haven't told us if any of those weapons ever left Air Force control.

* hint.  It's an answer with only two letters.  Starts with 'N.'

It's more the fact that the transport of the nukes wasn't discovered until the plane landed.  The entire time it was in the air, the AF was clueless as to what it was carrying, and the base from which it left was unaware that they were missing nukes.  The pilot, and air traffic control, and all the rest were treating the plane as if it was a routine flight, which it wasn't.

If the weapons had left air force control, this would have been a more egregious security violation.  That doesn't in any way mean that what did occur was trivial.

[Scratch33]

You still haven't told us if any of those weapons ever left Air Force control.

* hint.  It's an answer with only two letters.  Starts with 'N.'

Wrong question.  Did those nuclear weapons leave the control of the responsible parties within the Air Force?  

That answer obviously has 3 letters.

[jerome_oneil]

It's more the fact that the transport of the nukes wasn't discovered until the plane landed.  The entire time it was in the air, the AF was clueless as to what it was carrying, and the base from which it left was unaware that they were missing nukes.  The pilot, and air traffic control, and all the rest were treating the plane as if it was a routine flight, which it wasn't.

If the weapons had left air force control, this would have been a more egregious security violation.  That doesn't in any way mean that what did occur was trivial.

Certainly not a trivial event.  In fact, lets hypothesize an even more egregious error, and say the B-52 crashed.

Who gets to the crash site 1st.  The fire department and the Air Force, or the turrorists?

[sprintrock]

I think you meant to say "This'll get a person or two promoted"

Hasn't anyone noticed that there's almost zero accountability for incompetence in America anymore?  Donald Trump popularized the term "You're Fired!" but I don't think it's actually practiced in this country anymore...in the private or public sector.  These days incompetence usually leads to:  payed leave, administrative leave, corrective action (which amounts to nothing), or even promotion.

Not to thread jack or start a vicious debate on the subject, but look at the Abu Gharab (pardon the spelling) Prison fiasco in Iraq.  I am sure some officers knew what was going on and the only ones getting burned are the enlisted.  I think they should be punished for this embarrassment, but come on don't you think some brass knew what was going on.  I served in the Corps and I can't imagine pulling shit like that and my Lt being oblivious.  Anyway sorry for going off your topic, but UFO got me thinking about the fact that people get rewarded for bad behavior.  

[Req]

Certainly not a trivial event.  In fact, lets hypothesize an even more egregious error, and say the B-52 crashed.

Who gets to the crash site 1st.  The fire department and the Air Force, or the turrorists?

Prolly the fire department and airforce.  After all, there aren't any turrorists in the US, 'cause we're fightin' 'em over there so we don't hafta fight 'em here.  

This is, however, evidence that enough of the control structure for nuclear weapon control can be broken, subverted, or just plain ignored to get them onto an aircraft without authorization.  Imagine for a moment that some sketchy East German terrorists with funny accents had offered that aircraft's crew $50 million each for ze nuklear veapons...

I sincerely hope that the AF figures out what went wrong and fixes it up good.

[Rogue]

Imagine for a moment that some sketchy East German terrorists with funny accents had offered that aircraft's crew $50 million each for ze nuklear veapons...

I find it impossible that such a crew would even take up the offer.

[jerome_oneil]

I sincerely hope that the AF figures out what went wrong and fixes it up good.

You can absolutely count on that.

[Req]

I find it impossible that such a crew would even take up the offer.

'Member how the pilot didn't know he was carrying nukes?

You can absolutely count on that.

Yeah, this isn't some political thing, I'm positive that they take it very, very seriously.

[livetoride]

B-52 mistakenly flies with nukes aboard

By Michael Hoffman - Staff writer
Posted : Wednesday Sep 5, 2007 14:39:12 EDT
   
A B-52 bomber mistakenly loaded with five nuclear warheads flew from Minot Air Force Base, N.D., to Barksdale Air Force Base, La., on Aug. 30, resulting in an Air Force-wide investigation, according to three officers who asked not to be identified because they were not authorized to discuss the incident.

The B-52 was loaded with Advanced Cruise Missiles, part of a Defense Department effort to decommission 400 of the ACMs. But the nuclear warheads should have been removed at Minot before being transported to Barksdale, the officers said. The missiles were mounted onto the pylons of the bomber’s wings.

Advanced Cruise Missiles carry a W80-1 warhead with a yield of 5 to 150 kilotons and are specifically designed for delivery by B-52 strategic bombers.

Air Force spokesman Lt. Col. Ed Thomas said the transfer was safely conducted and the weapons were in Air Force custody and control at all times.

However, the mistake was not discovered until the B-52 landed at Barskdale, which left the warheads unaccounted for during the approximately 3 1/2 hour flight between the two bases, the officers said.

http://www.armytimes.com/news/2007/09/marine_nuclear_B52_070904w/

We live in odd times, I mean I think it's odd that the first thing our officers do when there has been an error is call the MEDIA..
-Peter

[jerome_oneil]

'Member how the pilot didn't know he was carrying nukes?



Yeah, this isn't some political thing, I'm positive that they take it very, very seriously.

Here is another scenario.  When a military aircraft crashes on a base, the fire department asks a few basic questions first.  "What kind of craft was it?" so they know how to egress the flight crew, and most importantly "What was the weapons and fuel load?"

How would you like to be some firefighter in the bomb bay of a skidded out B-52 and find yourself with that tingly feeling in your nads?   "They told me these were practice weapons, but they aren't blue!"

It's also worth noting that general weapons security, even for conventional iron bombs and missiles, in the Air Force is pretty strict.  Much stricter than the Navy's.   I remember my dad (career in the Air Force fire services) sitting on the mess decks on Ranger during a Tiger cruise on the way back from Gulf War I.  The weapons guys we're moving missiles from one SAF to another.   The weapons elevators open onto the mess decks, so they'd be rolling live warheads through groups of sailors eating lunch.   In the Air Force, they have armed convoys and transport the entire way.  

Dad was amazed that they'd just roll missiles through the mess decks while we were eating.   I can't imagine what the security precautions are for special weapons.

[Scratch33]

We live in odd times, I mean I think it's odd that the first thing our officers do when there has been an error is call the MEDIA..
-Peter

I'm sure that wasn't the first thing any officers did; and I'm also sure they were aware that the incident would eventually become public at any rate.  

Better IMO to announce both it and the investigation now, through official channels; than be accused of attempting to cover it up.

[Scratch33]

It's also worth noting that general weapons security, even for conventional iron bombs and missiles, in the Air Force is pretty strict.  Much stricter than the Navy's.   I remember my dad (career in the Air Force fire services) sitting on the mess decks on Ranger during a Tiger cruise on the way back from Gulf War I.  The weapons guys we're moving missiles from one SAF to another.   The weapons elevators open onto the mess decks, so they'd be rolling live warheads through groups of sailors eating lunch.   In the Air Force, they have armed convoys and transport the entire way.  

Dad was amazed that they'd just roll missiles through the mess decks while we were eating.   I can't imagine what the security precautions are for special weapons.

I was in a Navy F-4 Squadron (VF-33) back in the mid 70's & worked on both the Hangar Deck and Flight Deck of the Independence (CV-62) and Eisenhower (CVN-69).  Although I was a mechanic, during bombing "derbies" and other such activities we'd get assigned to help the "Ordies" haul practice bombs, 500 lb. and 1000 lb. bombs, Sparrows and Sidewinders up to the flight deck and load them onto planes.  I don't recall any special security-related precautions for the conventional stuff.  But for nukes, everthing got shut down tight by the MARDET.  Absolutely no access to the Hangar or Flight Deck for anyone not involved.  

[Jeff N]

Define being "let go."

Terminated. Fired. Usually for incompetence, sometimes for a complete deriliction of duty, but mostly incompetence. We may not handle nuclear weapons around here, but the things we do could conceiveably affect millions of people.

[Giaka]

Blah that was just a dry run to see if they could pull it off. You know, so later the establishment can launch a 5kt tactical on a US city and point at (use W voice) AL KAIDA. Don't you guys listen to talk radio?  Actually they would need to launch two to prove the first wasn't a fluke.  

[MisterEd]

You guys are reading way, way, way too much in to this.

Remember, we're talking the US Guvimint here.  Furthermore, we're talking the US Military here.

The explanation for this is very simple:

The company clerk pulled form DD-57/J out of the file instead of the DDR-57/J.  He fills it out in quintuplicate and then has the General sign it.  But, the General signs in on the wrong line (since the bottom of the DD-57/J form has 8 places for signatures, rather than the DDR-57/J, which has ten - AND the Generals signature line isn't in the same place on the two forms) without realizing it.  The company clerk sends the form along to the base commander who also mistakenly signs in the wrong place on, what will become known soon as the wrong form.  When the form gets sent up to Division, the forms intake clerk there notices that it's a DD-57/J rather than a DDR-57/J and promptly fills out an RQS-1204/1206-7 form (which, as we know is the form required to inform the base commander that the wrong form was filed) and attaches it to the original DD-57/J, hands it to a courier and has it sent back to the base commander.

Meanwhile, thinking the correct form has been filed, the flightline guys load the B-52.

The DD-57/J (with attached RQS-1204/1206-7 - Notification, paperwork/form, incorrect application) has arrived back at the base commander's office where his clerk opens it, adds the specific unit notification of incorrect application of paperwork, and sends it back to the original clerk.  The original clerk realizes his error and goes and gets the DDR-57/J form for the general to sign and the whole process repeats itself - except for the fact that because this particular order is nuclear in nature, an incorrect form filing report (DoD form RPT-1999-JAG-3445/R) has to be filed by the original clerk and then approved by the general and the base commander.

Meanwhile, the B-52 has flown to its destination and sat on the ground for two days while THAT base's flightline commander awaits the DDR-57/J copy that he was supposed to have received before the plane landed (but the courier was late - no big deal, happens all the time)

See, simple.  It's ALWAYS about the paperwork.  ALWAYS.  

[Jeff N]

 

I assure you, Mrs. Buttle, the Ministry is very scrupulous about following up and eradicating any error. If you have any complaints which you'd like to make, I'd be more than happy to send you the appropriate forms.

[Scratch33]

Coming up next on "Nuke Bloopers and Practical Jokes"...

[vfrrider]

As a former Explosives Safety Officer, the nukes SHOULD have been kept in a special storage bunker until signed out (amount, serial number of each device, destination, purpose, who, when, etc.) escorted to the assigned place, loaded under duplicate sets of eyes to assure quality standards, escorted to the plane with BIG RED TAGS indicating loaded, and SPECIAL SYMBOLS indicating nukes so ALL in the area, especially the pilots and crew, knew before they were ever loaded. Once loaded, nuke armed planes are given special taxying and parking spaces for take-off, as well as all fire crews on standby in full CLass 3 gear.

Air corridors on flight plans in  special areas. In short, for this ACCIDENT to happen, about a dozen errors had to be made real bad and everyone would have needed to ignore every warning in the book.

And thats just the sending end, not the receiving end.

Larry
VFRrider

[jerome_oneil]

I was in a Navy F-4 Squadron (VF-33) back in the mid 70's & worked on both the Hangar Deck and Flight Deck of the Independence (CV-62) and Eisenhower (CVN-69).  Although I was a mechanic, during bombing "derbies" and other such activities we'd get assigned to help the "Ordies" haul practice bombs, 500 lb. and 1000 lb. bombs, Sparrows and Sidewinders up to the flight deck and load them onto planes.  I don't recall any special security-related precautions for the conventional stuff.  But for nukes, everthing got shut down tight by the MARDET.  Absolutely no access to the Hangar or Flight Deck for anyone not involved.  

I got out in '93, and that was pretty much the same thing then.   Iron bombs were like "who cares?"  Nukes?  You'd get shot.

[Scratch33]

I remember once we were on the hangar deck waiting for the elevator, standing next to a bomb cart loaded with a 1000 pounder, when a couple Filipinos from the officers mess stopped as they were walking by and asked whether the bomb was dangerous.  

"Aww Hell no dudes, these things are perfectly safe!" said one of my squadronmates, as he turned to the bomb and gave it a swift, vicious kick with his steel toed flight deck boot.  The mess guys freaked out and ran away.
 

[jerome_oneil]

And, just for you Chair Force dudes, the Navy would never lose a nuke like this.    

[Scratch33]

True dat!

[Joey Stalin]

Although the transportation itself doesn't worry me in the slightest (moving nukes around is a relatively safe event), the fact that it happened at all is incredible. The flight crew chief is supposed to know what he's carrying, do his inspection of the plane, and check it against his orders. You can't tell me that he didn't see five big nuclear warheads hanging from his wings. They're marked differently than normal warheads.

[Req]

And the information on what went wrong is beginning to come in...

the has more.

The AGM-129 is designed to carry silver W-80-1 nuclear warheads, which have a variable yield of between 5 and 150 kilotons. (A kiloton is equal to the explosive force of 1,000 tons of TNT.) The warheads were meant to have been removed from the missiles before shipment. In their place, crews were supposed to insert metal dummies of the same size and weight, but a different color, so the missiles could still be properly attached under the bomber's wings.

A munitions custodian officer is supposed to keep track of the nuclear warheads. In the case of cruise missiles, a stamp-size window on the missile's frame allows workers to peer inside to check whether the warheads within are silver. In many cases, a red ribbon or marker attached to the missile serves as an additional warning. Finally, before the missiles are moved, two-man teams are supposed to look at check sheets, bar codes and serial numbers denoting whether the missiles are armed.

Why the warheads were not noticed in this case is not publicly known. But once the missiles were certified as unarmed, a requirement for unique security precautions when nuclear warheads are moved -- such as the presence of specially armed security police, the approval of a senior base commander and a special tracking system -- evaporated.

The trucks hauled the missile pylons from the bunker into the bustle of normal air base traffic, onto Bomber Boulevard and M Street, before turning onto a tarmac apron where the missiles were loaded onto the B-52. The loading took eight hours because of unusual trouble attaching the pylon on the right side of the plane -- the one with the dummy warheads.

By 5:12 p.m., the B-52 was fully loaded. The plane then sat on the tarmac overnight without special guards, protected for 15 hours by only the base's exterior chain-link fence and roving security patrols.

Air Force rules required members of the jet's flight crew to examine all of the missiles and warheads before the plane took off. But in this instance, just one person examined only the six unarmed missiles and inexplicably skipped the armed missiles on the left, according to officials familiar with the probe.

"If they're not expecting a live warhead it may be a very casual thing -- there's no need to set up the security system and play the whole nuclear game," said Vest, the former Minot airman. "As for the air crew, they're bus drivers at this point, as far as they know."

The plane, which had flown to Minot for the mission and was not certified to carry nuclear weapons, departed the next morning for Louisiana. When the bomber landed at Barksdale at 11:23 a.m., the air crew signed out and left for lunch, according to the probe.

It would be another nine hours -- until 8:30 p.m. -- before a Barksdale ground crew turned up at the parked aircraft to begin removing the missiles. At 8:45, 15 minutes into the task, a separate missile transport crew arrived in trucks. One of these airmen noticed something unusual about the missiles. Within an hour, a skeptical supervisor had examined them and ordered them secured.

By then it was 10 p.m., more than 36 hours after the warheads left their secure bunker in Minot.

Worth a read.  This is a system that ought not to have a single point of failure, but it appears that in this case it did.

[LENSMAN]

Define being "let go."  We've also had people "let go" for efficiency or spending reduction or their position becomes obsolete or their given a choice like "leave with this package or go on probation for 3 months at which time we will re-visit your performance" type crap.

In 10 years at this company I've never seen a person fired for incompetence or for screwing up.  And I'm talking about "You're fired.  Clear out your desk and turn in your badge to HR by noon." type scenario.  It seem very difficult to get your ass canned in this day and age of litigation.

We'll see what happens with the people involved with flying nukes around the country and not even knowing it.

In my company (picture the movie Groundhogs Day with Twilight Zone put in for  menace), screw up- move up, as long as you are politically connected.

They must have been new/untrained- how would you otherwise mistake a warhead equipped missile for one that doesn't have a warhead???  

[jerome_oneil]

They must have been new/untrained- how would you otherwise mistake a warhead equipped missile for one that doesn't have a warhead???  

It would appear they simply didn't check once they were on the aircraft.   The nukes were loaded on one side of the thing, and the conventional ones on the other.  They are supposed to validate that the weapons are or are not armed before the flight, and that didn't happen.

There are multiple failure points in this thing.  Someone is gonna get whacked, and whacked hard.

[Scratch33]

Five to be fired for Minot nuclear mistake

By Pauline Jelinek - The Associated Press
Posted : Thursday Oct 18, 2007 15:17:21 EDT
   
The Air Force is planning to fire at least five officers for an incident in which nuclear-armed missiles were mistakenly loaded on a B-52 bomber and flown across the U.S. — the worst known violation of nuclear security rules in decades.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates is scheduled to be briefed Friday on the plan to fire the officers and other results of a six-week Air Force probe into the Aug. 30 incident. No one noticed for hours that the weapons were on the bomber, several Defense Department officials said.

http://www.militarytimes.com/news/2007/10/ap_minot_firings_071018/

[Wilbur]

I think you meant to say "This'll get a person or two promoted"

Hasn't anyone noticed that there's almost zero accountability for incompetence in America anymore?

70 Punished in Accidental B-52 Flight
http://apnews.myway.com/article/20071020/D8SCT67O0.html

So much for that theory.

[maddjack]

I still think its intresting that 1) the ground crew could get to live nuclear munitions without any authorization,2 )the aircraft crew never noticed those munitions on the the aircraft,don;t they do a walk around of the aircraft before a peacetime flight anymore?
yes some sacrificial heads are rolling,but is it the tip of a much larger problem with the security of our nukes?

[Wilbur]

I still think its intresting that 1) the ground crew could get to live nuclear munitions without any authorization,2 )the aircraft crew never noticed those munitions on the the aircraft,don;t they do a walk around of the aircraft before a peacetime flight anymore?

That was all covered in the article.

yes some sacrificial heads are rolling,but is it the tip of a much larger problem with the security of our nukes?

Highest ranked among those punished were four officers who were relieved this week of their commands, including the 5th Bomb Wing commander at Minot - Col. Bruce Emig, who also has been the base commander since June.

In addition, the wing has been "decertified from its wartime mission," Newton said.

That doesn't sound like sacrificial heads to me. About the only thing worse than having the Secretary of Defense and the President of the United States notified of your f'up and relieving you of your command is a stretch at Leavenworth.